Designed to Reduce Risk

Situations Addressed

Apps and phone numbers can be problematic. The following situations are addressed by the core design of Convene.

• Exposure of social graph: For messaging apps where people are using real names and numbers, if a device gets confiscated, not only is information leaked, but the bad actors have access to the contacts of the person. In certain groups on WhatsApp, for example, people within the same group have been tracked down because of their association with the person or the topic.

• Coupling of personal and activist lives (includes shared devices): Having activism activities happening in the same place where personal relationships with family happen can be unsettling. It's common for people to separate their lives. For individuals with family living in countries with high surveillance and censorship, they are worried about the consequences their family might face because of their work.

• App blocking: Google Play not being available, Apple App Store censorship - Some apps, like Signal, are not easily available in high risk regions. And/or they could be criminalized.

• Platform blocking (ex: WhatsApp during unrest or internet shutdowns)

• Platform surveillance and censorship including criminal liability for group chat admins (ex: WeChat)

• Physical checkpoints: If a device is confiscated, certain apps can get people in trouble.

Mitigating Abuse and Misuse

The nature of the Convene technology is that it is providing a service accessible in a web browser by anyone that has a link. It does not require registration or verification within the app by the user. Everyone is pseudonymous when using Convene. This is all by design. And it means that it is just as easy as a malicious actor to participate as a good-intentioned activist.

Concerns

If bad actors join rooms, what all can or may they do?

• Troll: Send unwelcome or abusive messages

• Spy: Collect what's being shared and expose it

• Flood the chat and server with offensive messages

• Flood the chat and server with disinformation

• Entrap: Use direct links or room links to get people to share information while thinking they are talking to someone they trust

If authorities pick up on the links, what can they do?

• Block the domain

• Join group rooms if they are open

• Create their own groups or direct links

Concerns Addressed

Group Rooms

Features:

• Each room has a room moderator

• Room moderators can kick people out

• Rooms can be locked once everyone is in to prevent others from joining

• Moderators can make the room read only. With this setting, only moderators can send messages and media.

What can moderators do if a group room gets contaminated with undesired behavior:

• If abusive behavior is happening within a group, kick out room members that are causing trouble. Lock the room to prevent others from joining. If you need to invite more people to the room, move the conversation to a different room. If you create a new room and share the link within the current room, it will prevent the bad actors from being able to join. While giving you the ability to open the room to others. When sharing in the current room, the link is only exposed to the people that remain in that room. If you need to invite others, share the link privately in one-on-one chats.

What can be done to prevent entrapment?

• Make sure you trust the person that shared the link with you.

Direct Rooms

Features:

• In direct rooms, only 2 people are connected. Once 2 people are in, no one else can join that room. If the direct link is clicked by someone else, it will open a separate room. If the URL of the room is copied and shared, anyone that clicks on it will not be able to join.

What can be done to prevent entrapment?

• Leverage existing communication apps to verify. In a channel outside the app, verify with the person you intend to talk to that you are in the room. Share the names you are using.